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Abstract 
Since the late 1990s there have been substantial changes in the current account 
balances of a number of economies, most notably a marked widening in the current 
account deficit of the United States and increased net lending by many developing 
nations to developed economies. This paper uses panel data to examine what may 
have contributed to changes in the current account positions of a wide sample of 
developing and developed economies. In particular, we aim to assess the ‘global 
saving glut’ hypothesis that financial crises have contributed to the current account 
surpluses in developing economies. Overall, we find some support for this 
argument; there is a significant role for financial crises as well as institutional 
factors in determining current account balances. However, the model captures the 
broad trends evident in international capital flows for only some of the major 
regions in our sample. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F32, F41 
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1.  Introduction 
The late 1990s were a period of substantial change in the current account positions 
of the major economies worldwide. The most noticeable development was the 
widening in the current account deficit of the United States from less than 2 per 
cent of GDP in 1997 to around 6½ per cent of GDP in 2006. The funding for the 
increased deficit has come largely from developing nations. 
This paper, using a panel of 34 countries over the period 1991–2005, aims to 
examine what may have contributed to movements in the current account balances 
of both borrowing and lending nations. In particular, we aim to evaluate some of 
the explanations for the current pattern of international capital flows, particularly 
the global saving glut hypothesis due to Bernanke  (2005). Consequently, in 
addition to the more traditional explanatory variables – such as the terms of trade, 
the fiscal balance and those related to demographic and growth prospects – we also 
examine variables motivated by the global saving glut hypothesis, such as whether 
a financial crisis has occurred and measures of differences in the quality of 
institutions across countries. In contrast to previous studies we use higher-
frequency data in an attempt to better capture the effects of financial crises on the 
current account. 
Overall, we find some support for the global saving glut hypothesis; in particular, 
there appears to be a significant role for financial crises and institutional factors in 
determining the current account. However, we find that these factors cannot 
explain some of the trends evident in international capital flows. 2 
2.  What are the Global Imbalances? 
The past decade has seen sizeable changes in the current account positions of a 
number of regions around the world.1 From the start of the 1980s to the mid 1990s 
the US ran small current account deficits (fluctuating around 1½ per cent of GDP), 
as did some other developed English-speaking economies (Table 1). Developing 
economies in east Asia, Latin America and oil-producing regions also ran current 
account deficits during the early to mid 1990s. These deficits were offset by 
surpluses, primarily in Japan. 
Since 1997 the US current account deficit has increased considerably, 
accompanied by increases in the deficits of some of the other English-speaking 
nations. Although Japan, and to a lesser extent the euro area, provided some offset 
to these deficits, a number of developing countries have become sizeable net 
exporters of savings. China has run a current account surplus since 1994, east Asia 
since 1998, the major oil exporters from 1999, and Argentina and Brazil (the two 
largest non-oil-exporting Latin American countries) since 2002. By the end of 
2005 the combined surpluses of these developing countries accounted for around 
three-quarters of the US current account deficit. These movements took place 
during a period of rapidly appreciating asset prices in a number of developed 
countries and low long-term interest rates. 
Another dimension of these global imbalances has been the accumulation of large 
stocks of foreign exchange reserves, primarily US dollars, by Asian central banks 
after the Asian crisis (Figure 1). 
Escalating world oil and commodity prices may have also contributed to a change 
in the distribution of current account balances. Net natural resource exporters, 
many of which are developing nations, have benefited from a higher terms of trade. 
The trade balance of some of these countries has increased noticeably as a result. 
In line with this, it appears that only a small proportion of the increased oil 
revenues have been spent by oil-exporting nations. 
                                           
1  For a comprehensive overview, see Orsmond (2005). 
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Table 1: Current Account Balances 
Region  1980–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2006 
Current US billion dollars 
US –77.8  –66.5  –178.4  –493.9  –824.1 
Euro area  9.8  –24.8  59.7  27.7  –9.7 
Japan 42.1  97.4  101.5  125.7  168.0 
UK –7.9  –21.8  –13.1  –30.7  –60.9 
Australia and NZ  –10.6  –14.5  –20.5  –24.2  –50.5 
China –1.2  5.5  18.6  37.6  199.7 
East Asia
(a) 5.2  –1.4  20.1  82.4  110.8 
Major oil exporters
(b)  8.2 –32.4  16.6 121.0 368.5 
Argentina and Brazil  –7.4  –4.5  –36.3  –6.4  18.2 
Per cent of GDP 
US –1.7  –1.0  –2.1  –4.6  –6.4 
Euro area  0.2  –0.4  0.9  0.3  –0.1 
Japan 2.1  2.4  2.3  2.9  3.8 
UK –0.9  –2.1  –1.0  –1.9  –2.6 
Australia and NZ  –4.6  –3.9  –4.5  –4.2  –6.0 
China –0.3  1.4  1.9  2.4  8.1 
East Asia
(a) 0.4  –0.1  1.7  4.9  4.7 
Major oil exporters
(b) 0.8  –3.3  1.2  6.3  11.7 
Argentina and Brazil  –2.3  –0.6  –3.4  –0.6  1.6 
Notes:  2006 figures are IMF estimates. Some estimates are also used for 2005. 
  (a) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand 
and Vietnam. 
  (b) Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Venezuela. 
Source: IMF, IFS, WEO 
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Figure 1: Reserve Assets 


















Notes:  (a) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. 
  (b) Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates  
and Venezuela. 
Sources:  IMF, IFS, WEO; World Bank, WDI 
3.  Theoretical and Empirical Background 
The intertemporal approach is the predominant framework used to analyse the 
current account. It essentially is an extension of the permanent income hypothesis 
to an open economy, with the current account viewed as the outcome of forward-
looking savings and investment decisions based on expectations of future 
economic conditions. The current account absorbs transitory changes in a nation’s 
level of output or investment as agents attempt to smooth consumption. For 
example, if the current level of output is temporarily low, agents would borrow 
from abroad so as to smooth their consumption, lowering the current account 
balance. Empirical support for the intertemporal approach is mixed; see   
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for a review. 
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This can be further extended to link a nation’s current account position to its stage 
of economic development. Countries that have a low level of development tend to 
have low capital-to-labour ratios and consequently the marginal product of capital 
is high. This implies that developing nations should tend to attract capital from 
developed countries where labour tends to be relatively scarce, resulting in 
developing countries running a current account deficit. As these nations reach a 
more advanced stage of development, they run current account surpluses to reduce 
their accumulated external liabilities and as the marginal product of capital falls. 
Empirical support for such effects has been limited (see for example Lucas 1990, 
Debelle and Faruqee 1996 and Chinn and Prasad 2003). One explanation for this, 
emphasised by Alfaro, Kalemil-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005), is that differences 
in institutional quality – such as the effectiveness of legal systems and the absence 
of corruption and political stability – bias capital flows towards developed nations. 
Demographic variation can also be used to explain differences in current accounts 
across countries. If the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis are aggregated 
over individuals, a negative relationship should exist between aggregate domestic 
savings and the share of the non-working-age population. Masson, Bayoumi and 
Samiei (1995), Disney (1996) and Davis (2006) find evidence in support of this 
relationship. 
The current account balance may react to the unanticipated component in a 
temporary positive (negative) terms of trade shock as consumers smooth their 
consumption by saving part of the income gain (borrowing to offset the   
income loss).2 
The rapid increase in the US current account deficit over recent years has been the 
focus of a growing body of literature, some of which draws on the intertemporal 
framework. One view that has received considerable attention is the ‘global saving 
glut’ hypothesis of Bernanke (2005). Bernanke argues that financial crises cause 
capital flows to reverse, flowing from developing to industrialised countries. In 
                                           
2  Kent and Cashin (2003) present evidence that the persistence of the terms of trade shock 
influences its impact on the current account. In particular, with persistent shocks, savings will 
tend not to adjust much compared with investment, and consequently the terms of trade and 
the current account can move in opposite directions. However, in this paper we have not 
attempted to separate the predictable and unanticipated components of terms of trade 
movements, nor have we distinguished between transitory and persistent shocks. 
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particular, emerging market economies, especially in Asia, built up foreign 
exchange reserves to safeguard against potential future capital outflows and, to a 
lesser extent, as a result of promoting export-led growth (a point also discussed by 
Macfarlane 2005). In doing so, governments in these nations channelled domestic 
savings into international capital markets. Summers (2006) remarks that reserves in 
developing countries are at a level that is ‘far in excess of any previously 
enunciated criterion of reserves needed for financial protection’. Bernanke argues 
this excess saving placed downward pressure on real interest rates, stimulating 
borrowing, and consequently asset prices, in developed countries. 
The importance of differences in the quality of financial markets and institutions in 
explaining developments in nations’ current accounts is emphasised by Caballero, 
Farhi and Gourinchas (2007). They argue that a change in the perception of the 
ability of domestic financial markets to provide sound financial instruments for 
savings results in increased funds flowing abroad. Such a re-evaluation could result 
from the onset of a financial crisis, with funds flowing to nations such as the US, 
which have more developed financial markets. In effect, Caballero et al are more 
explicit than Bernanke (2005) with regards to the transmission mechanism by 
which financial crises influence current accounts. They emphasise the role of a 
collapse in the supply of suitable financial assets domestically rather than growth 
in foreign reserves as the means by which domestic savings are driven abroad. In 
an earlier version of their paper, Caballero et al also argue that the stronger growth 
prospects of the US has caused these funds to flow to the US rather than to Europe, 
even though both economies have the ability to produce suitable financial assets. 
Such an outcome is also suggested by the intertemporal model of Engel and 
Rogers (2006). 
An alternative model is provided by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004a) 
(referred to as Bretton Woods II), who argue that developing countries have 
deliberately undervalued their exchange rates so as to promote growth in the 
traded-goods sector (and, for China, to absorb a large shift of rural workers to 
urban areas). It is also argued that developing countries are taking advantage of the 
higher quality of financial intermediation abroad by exporting their savings there 
as a form of collateral to obtain foreign direct investment to promote economic 
development (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2004b). 
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Recent empirical analysis has tended to support the notion that differences in the 
quality of financial markets and institutions across nations influence the size of the 
current account. Alfaro et al (2005) find that institutional quality is an important 
determinant of capital inflows, with a positive relationship existing between the 
two variables. Likewise, Gruber and Kamin (2007) find that improvements in the 
institutional quality of a nation’s markets lead to lower current account balances, as 
does stronger output growth. Similarly, Chinn and Ito (2007) find that a nation’s 
current account balance is likely to be lower, the higher is its level of legal 
development and the more open are its financial markets. 
Gruber and Kamin (2007) find that financial crises have a significant effect on 
current account balances (when interacted with a term to capture trade openness). 
Hence, they argue that models using standard determinants of the current account 
should be augmented with variables representing financial crises. The authors 
postulate that financial crises encourage a current account surplus by restraining 
domestic demand and credit. 
The increase in the US current account deficit has also been linked to the increase 
in the US fiscal deficit and the decline in the savings rate of US households. 
However, whether a decline in government or private savings actually leads to an 
increase in the current account deficit is ambiguous. For example, an increase in a 
nation’s fiscal deficit may decrease its current account balance if the private sector 
does not increase its saving to offset any rise in future liabilities due to the fiscal 
deficit (that is, if Ricardian equivalence does not apply). Simulations using a 
Federal Reserve Board macroeconomic model suggest that the increase in the 
budget deficit and the fall in private savings were only a minor factor contributing 
to the increase in the US current account deficit (Ferguson 2005). Similarly,   
Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005) find that fiscal policy has a small effect on the 
trade balance. 
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4.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of annual data for 34 countries over the period 
1991–2005, accounting for nearly 90 per cent of global output in 2005. It includes 
all major economies together with a number of the major oil exporters and those 
countries directly affected by the Asian crisis.3 We choose to explain movements 
in the current account balance as a per cent of GDP. In contrast to previous studies, 
for example, those by Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007), which 
use five-year average data, our sample comprises annual data.4 We do this since 
annual data may allow us to better identify the impact of financial crises on the 
current account. In particular, it has the advantage of allowing for short crises 
whose impact would be muted by the use of five-year averages, and allows a 
profile for the impact of financial crises on current accounts to be derived. 
The independent variables used in this study, which are outlined in greater detail 
below, can be grouped into two categories: (i) those variables which have 
traditionally been used to explain movements in the current account; and   
(ii) variables related to the newer theories that have arisen in response to the 
widening in the US current account deficit. 
Since the sum of the current account balances of the nations in our sample equals 
zero (ignoring measurement error and assuming the net current account of the 
small  countries excluded from our sample is balanced), a rise in one nation’s 
current account balance must be offset by a fall in the current account balances of 
other nations. Therefore, a uniform increase in an explanatory variable across all 
nations should have no effect on the aggregate current account balance of our 
sample. Accordingly, we have constructed our variables such that the aggregated 
predicted current account balance is unaffected by a common change in any 
explanatory variable. To do this, we typically express our explanatory variables as 
                                           
3   The countries included in the data sample are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Russia,   
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. 
4  Chinn and Ito (2007) also estimate models based on annual data, however, these are not their 
primary focus. 
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deviations from GDP-weighted averages, consistent with the approach employed 
by Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and Kamin (2007).5 
The data are sourced primarily from cross-country databases, including the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). For a comprehensive 
description of the data and its sources, see Appendix A. 
4.1  Global Saving Glut and Financial Depth Variables 
4.1.1  Financial crises 
The global saving glut hypothesis attributes the shift of many developing nations to 
being net lenders to the ongoing impact of their financial crises. We identify 
financial crises as those episodes listed as: (i)  systemic banking crises in   
Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); or (ii) a currency crisis lasting for at least 12 months 
by Kaminsky (2003).6 To limit endogeneity problems we exclude those financial 
crises attributed by Kaminsky to a widening of the current account deficit or 
sudden stops. Our definition of financial crises is consequently broader than that 
used by Gruber and Kamin (2007), who only consider systematic banking crises, 
although our results are not sensitive to using their narrower definition.7 We 
employ some flexibility in the dating of financial crises; we date those which occur 
late in a year as starting in the following year as they are unlikely to materially 
affect the annual data until then. A list of crises and their starting dates is presented 
in Appendix B. 
                                           
5  The terms of trade is already a relative concept so deviations from GDP-weighted averages 
were not calculated for this variable. 
6  Crises that Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) date as at least a decade long are excluded (China, 
Japan and Nigeria), however, their inclusion does not materially change the results. We also 
require crises in a particular nation to be more than 12 months apart. 
7  Excluding non-banking crises increases the coefficients on the financial crisis dummies, but 
the results are not changed materially. 
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A visual inspection suggests that the increase in the current account balance often 
peaks about two to three years after a crisis and the effects of crises may be 
prolonged (Figure 2). However, we also wish to allow the effects of crises to be 
short if the data dictates. Consequently, we specify financial crises using a dummy 
variable for the year of the crisis and include a lag for each of the subsequent  
four years.8 
Figure 2: Current Account Balances and Financial Crises –  
Selected Countries 





















Notes:  Argentina and Brazil refer to the 2001 and 1999 crises respectively. See Appendix B for the dates of the 
other crises. 
Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
The financial crisis dummies, following Gruber and Kamin (2007), are expressed 
as deviations from a GDP-weighted average. Consequently, when there has been at 
least one financial crisis in our sample in a given year, the financial crisis dummy 
takes on a negative value for those countries that have not had a crisis. The 
advantage of this approach is that financial crises are allowed to have some 
                                           
8  In the construction of the lags, we allowed for crises beginning before 1991. Our definition of 
the financial crisis dummy variables takes into account contagion to the extent that a crisis in 
one country results in a crisis in another country. 
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(opposite) effect upon the current account balances of nations not in crisis. This is 
appropriate because the aggregate current account balance of the sample is still 
zero after each crisis. 
4.1.2  Financial depth 
In recent years private capital has flowed into the US and other developed 
countries. Caballero et al (2007) argue that this is partially because these countries 
are able to produce suitable financial instruments. We interpret this as meaning that 
financial markets in these countries are deeper and more liquid. We use annual 
stock market turnover as a proportion of share market capitalisation (the stock 
market turnover ratio) from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) as a proxy 
for financial depth.9 
Liquidity is only one dimension of the ‘quality’ of financial assets; for example, 
the return on an investment also depends on the security of property rights. The 
quality of institutions in the US and a range of other developed countries may have 
been a factor contributing to their appeal as a destination for foreign private 
capital. We measure institutional quality using the Economic Freedom of the 
World index from Gwartney and Lawson (2006). This index is constructed using 
five equally weighted sub-indices, including measures of ‘legal structure and 
property rights’ and the ‘freedom to trade internationally’.10 These indices are 
bounded by zero and ten, with higher values denoting better institutional quality, 
and are based on both objective and subjective measures. Different measures of 
institutional quality are used by Chinn and Ito (2007) and Gruber and   
Kamin (2007). However, we choose the Economic Freedom of the World index 
because it is readily available and covers a greater range of countries over a longer 
time period. Movements in the index when financial crises occur are mixed; it does 
not tend to decline sharply, in part because it is not available at an annual 
frequency before 2000. Movements in stock market turnover following the onset of 
                                           
9  In contrast, Chinn and Ito (2007) use the ratio of private credit to GDP as their proxy variable. 
We obtain qualitatively similar results using their measure, in lieu of stock market turnover, 
over a longer sample (1980–2005). 
10  The five sub-indices are: size of government expenditures, taxes and enterprises; legal 
structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to trade 
internationally; and regulation of credit, labour and business. 
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a crisis are also mixed, with turnover declining in some instances, but increasing in 
others (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Financial Depth, Institutional Quality and Financial Crises – 
Selected Countries 
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Years from crisis  
Notes:  The crises shown for Argentina and Brazil are those of 2001 and 1999 respectively. See Appendix B for 
the dates of the other crises. 
Sources: Beck  et al (2000); Gwartney and Lawson (2006); authors’ calculations 
4.2  Traditional Determinants of the Current Account 
The intertemporal model suggests that future economic growth is an important 
determinant of the current account, and authors such as Engel and Rogers (2006) 
have argued that the stronger growth prospects for the US compared to other 
economies, such as in Europe, can explain its current account deficit. In contrast to 
other recent empirical studies, such as Chinn and Ito (2007), who use the growth 
rate in labour productivity as a proxy for expected output growth, we use two-year-
ahead forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, which are available for 
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a wide range of countries from 1991 onwards.11 These forecasts will include   
both expected cyclical fluctuations and growth in potential output. 
Caballero et al (2007) note that: 
… it matters a great deal who is growing faster and who is growing slower than 
the US. If those that compete with the US in asset production (such as Europe) 
grow slower and those that demand assets (such as emerging Asia and oil 
producing economies) grow faster, then both factors play in the direction of 
generating capital flows towards the US. (p 16) 
It is difficult to capture such effects in a model such as ours. However, in an 
attempt to do so we interact the growth forecasts with the three variables that cover 
various aspects of the perceived depth of a nation’s financial markets, namely, 
stock market depth, the quality of institutions and whether a financial crisis has 
occurred in the past five years. 
To capture the effects of shifts in demographics and in the fiscal position, we 
include the dependency ratio (the ratio of the non-working-age population to the 
working-age population) and the fiscal balance as a per cent of GDP.12 Growth in 
the terms of trade (defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices) is included 
to control for, amongst other things, the effects of fluctuations in global oil   
and commodity prices on the current account balances of net natural resource   
exporting countries. 
4.3  Estimation 
We allow for unobserved time-invariant influences on each country’s current 
account balance by using a fixed-effects estimator. Chinn and Ito (2007) primarily 
pool data (one constant is estimated for all countries in the sample). The cost of 
using fixed effects relative to pooling is that we are unable to include variables that 
are time invariant in the regression. However, time-invariant factors are not a 
                                           
11 This compares favourably to other potential sources, such as Consensus Forecasts. Over our 
sample period, the WEO was published twice a year, in April or May and September or 
October. We use the April/May forecasts to maximise the forecast horizon. The cost of using 
these forecasts compared to labour productivity is that they are available for a much shorter 
time period. Nevertheless, the sample is constrained by the stock market turnover data. 
12 The working-age population is defined as those aged between 15 and 64 years. 
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feature of the global saving glut hypothesis, nor Caballero et al’s (2007) 
hypotheses and, therefore, the ability to separately identify them is not of   
primary concern. 
In summary, the regressions we estimate are of the form: 
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where: ηi is the fixed effect for country i; εit the error term; and βj are parameters.13 
The model excluding lags of the current account balance is estimated by first 
differencing Equation (1) to remove the fixed effect and then using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). When a lag of the dependent variable is included, the first lag of 
the current account balance will be correlated with the error term, and 
consequently we use two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), instrumenting the lagged 
dependent variable with a longer lag. This method is known as the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator, after Anderson and Hsiao (1982).14 We chose this approach in lieu of 
using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), following Arellano and   
Bond (1991), because our panel has a large time dimension but only a relatively 
small number of cross-sections. In this case, simulation evidence by Judson and 
                                           
13  We assume that the slope parameters are the same across all countries. Relaxing this 
assumption is complicated by the need to control for the global current account balance, but 
would be an interesting area of further research. 
14  The estimation was conducted in Stata 9 using the xtserial and ivreg2 commands for   
OLS and 2SLS, which are due to Drukker (2003) and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007). 
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Owen (1999) suggests that the simpler Anderson-Hsiao estimator performs 
comparatively well in terms of bias.15 
5.  Results 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of our model with various lags of the 
dependent variable. If no lags are included the model has significant first-order 
autocorrelation; it is only when two lags are introduced that the regression displays 
no significant second-order autocorrelation.16 Gruber and Kamin (2007) note that 
the lag can be motivated by habit persistence and find it to be significant at the 
10 per cent level despite using five-year average data. It may also reflect 
adjustment costs and uncertainty (Kent and Cashin 2003). 
Focusing on the model with two lags of the dependent variable, we find that 
financial crises appear to have a significant and positive effect on the current 
account balance (as a per cent of GDP), which is around 2.2 percentage points 
higher in the year after the crisis.17 The effect of the crisis is short-lived – the crisis 
dummies for the third and fourth years after its onset are insignificant at the   
10 per cent level. It is surprising that these effects do not last longer, given that 
after the Asian crisis, the building of ‘war chests’ of foreign reserves appears 
ongoing (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, the finding that financial crises do boost the 
current account balance is consistent with the global saving glut hypothesis, and 
contrasts with the findings of Gruber and Kamin (2007), whose models only found  
 
                                           
15 See Roodman (2006) for a discussion of estimating dynamic panels using GMM. Another 
alternative would be to use the approach of Kiviet (1995), which approximates the size of the 
bias and corrects for it, and is known as the Least Square Dummy Variable Corrected 
(LSDVC) estimator. Bruno (2005) generalises this estimator to unbalanced panels. However, 
it assumes that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, which in our case seems to be 
a strong assumption. 
16 Second-order autocorrelation is problematic as it implies that the residuals in Equation (1) 
have first-order autocorrelation and that our instruments are inappropriate. The Arellano-Bond 
test for autocorrelation is implemented in Stata with the abar command (Roodman 2004). 
17 In the discussion of the impact of a change in the explanatory variables, we assume that it 
does not alter the GDP-weighted average. This, obviously, is a poor approximation for a large 
country, such as the United States, for which any given change will have less impact 
(compared to a small country) as it will tend to lift the GDP-weighted average. 
 16 
Table 2: Estimation Results (continued next page) 
Dependent variable is the current account to GDP ratio 
  Excluding  
CA lags 
Including one  
CA lag 
  Including two  
CA lags 
 OLS  2SLS    2SLS 




(CA/GDP)it–2       –0.24*** 
(0.05) 




























































































Table 2: Estimation Results (continued) 
Dependent variable is the current account to GDP ratio 
  Excluding  
CA lags 
Including one  
CA lag 
 Including  two 
CA lags 
 OLS  2SLS    2SLS 
R
2 0.38  0.21    0.40 
Number of observations  444  444     443 




   
Instruments   (CA/GDP)it–2   ∆(CA/GDP)it–3 






Notes:  Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels respectively. Fixed effects are not reported. 
 
a positive relationship when the financial crisis dummy variable was interacted 
with a term to capture the openness of the economy. 
Deeper financial markets appear to attract capital inflows and allow countries to 
run a lower current account balance than otherwise. This may reflect the greater 
ability of these nations to produce suitable financial assets (as suggested by 
Caballero et al 2007) or, more generally, they make a country a more attractive 
destination for foreign capital. However, the coefficient on stock market turnover 
(financial deepness), is not significantly different from zero at the 10 per cent level, 
which could, in part, reflect collinearity with the term that interacts this variable 
with the growth forecasts.18 A possible economic rationale for the insignificance of 
the stock market turnover coefficient is that the institutional quality variable – 
which is highly significant and has the expected negative sign – is capturing the 
ability to deliver suitable financial assets, as outlined in Caballero et al. If so, this 
would suggest that the onset of a financial crisis might not be associated with a 
sharp reversal in perceived financial depth, as the institutions variable tends not to 
vary much around a crisis (Figure 3).19 This may reflect both the infrequency with 
which the institutions variable is measured and the fact that, by construction, it 
                                           
18 The magnitude of the coefficient remains broadly unchanged when the interaction term is 
omitted, but the standard error decreases considerably. 
19 On the flipside, the institutions measure may not capture improvements that might be 
undertaken post-crisis in order to attract funds (including from the IMF). 
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places considerable weight upon objective (statistical) indicators of institutions and 
therefore it may not capture perceived institutional quality very well. It is possible 
that prior to the east Asian crisis, for example, investors were overly optimistic 
about the quality of prevailing institutions. 
As we have not included a variable to explicitly capture the stage of development, 
one might have expected the institutions variable to do so. However, the negative 
coefficient for the institutions variable runs counter to the development hypothesis. 
The fiscal balance is estimated to be an important determinant of the current 
account; a 1 percentage point reduction in the fiscal balance (relative to GDP) ratio 
is associated with an immediate 0.3 percentage point decrease in the current 
account balance (as a per cent of GDP). This estimate is approximately three times 
the value obtained by Gruber and Kamin (2007), but is within the range of 
estimates reported by Chinn and Ito (2007).20 
Demographic factors are estimated to have a significant impact on a nation’s 
current account, with a 1 percentage point rise in the dependency ratio lowering the 
current account balance by around 0.5 percentage points of GDP. The direction of 
this effect is consistent with expectations, as the savings rate for dependents is 
likely to be less than that for the working-age population. 
Bernanke (2005) argues that the increase in oil prices since the late 1990s was a 
factor contributing to nations in Africa and the Middle East shifting to be net 
lenders of capital. Our estimates broadly support this: growth in the terms of trade 
of 1 per cent in a year is estimated to increase a nation’s current account balance 
by around 0.2 percentage points of GDP by the end of the following year. 
Better prospects for future growth appear to be associated with a significant 
decline in the current account balance. Ignoring the interaction terms, a 
1 percentage point rise in the relative growth forecast is estimated to decrease the 
current account by around 1.6 percentage points of GDP. The interaction terms are 
generally insignificant. (These terms attempt to allow for the possibility that 
                                           
20 Chinn and Ito raise the possibility that the fiscal balance is endogenous. When we instrument 
the change in the fiscal balance with itself lagged two years, the coefficient drops to 0.14 and 
is insignificant. 
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growth may create demand for financial assets, but if domestic financial markets 
are unable to provide such assets then this would stimulate capital outflows.) The 
exception is the interaction between growth forecasts and the quality of 
institutions, which suggests, for example, that the marginal effect of an increase in 
the growth forecasts on the current account balance is more negative for nations 
with below-average institutions. We do not consider this strong evidence against 
the hypotheses of Caballero et al (2007), as it is difficult to capture the interactions 
between the supply and demand for financial assets in our model. 
6.  Implications for Regional Current Account Balances 
In this section we examine the ability of the model to explain various elements of 
the global saving glut hypothesis, including the widening of the US current account 
deficit and the increased capital outflows from east Asia, China and the   
oil-producing nations. 
The model estimates that the US current account deficit should have narrowed 
slightly from 1997 onwards, rather than the widening that actually occurred 
(Figure 4).21 This result was also obtained by Gruber and Kamin (2007), and while 
the model of Chinn and Ito  (2007) predicts an increase in the current account 
deficit over this period, the estimated level is around 2 per cent of GDP, instead of 
the actual deficit of 5 per cent. Nevertheless, it is still instructive to look at the 
contributions of the various factors, which are shown in Figure 4.22 The large role 
attributed to the quality of institutions is immediately obvious; ignoring the 
interaction terms, as institutions in the US were above the GDP-weighted average 
for the entire sample, they contributed more than 3 percentage points to the current 
account deficit, although, interestingly, their contribution has decreased since the 
late 1990s. More generally, this supports Bernanke’s (2005) argument that, in 
order for developing countries to move to having net capital inflows, they should 
‘… improve their investment climates by continuing to increase macroeconomic 
                                           
21 To construct the estimate of the fixed effect, we take the parameters from our estimated 
equation (which is the difference of Equation (1)) and apply them to Equation (1). The fixed 
effect for each country is then the average residual. 
22 This figure was motivated by Figure 7 in Gruber and Kamin (2007). 
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stability, strengthen property rights, reduce corruption, and remove barriers to the 
free flow of financial capital’. 
The estimated contribution of the widening of the fiscal deficit does not appear to 
have been the primary reason for the widening current account, despite being 
considerably larger than that in Gruber and Kamin (2007). Similarly, the influence 
of demographic factors is small, although this may in part reflect the inclusion of 
fixed effects.23 The impact of the increase in the growth forecasts since 2000 is 
reduced by the interaction with the institutions variable (included in ‘other’ in 
Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Estimated Contribution to US Current Account Balance 
Per cent of GDP 
Growth forecasts
%























                                          
 
Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
It is possible that the model does not capture the widening of the US current 
account deficit as it does not adequately ‘channel’ the impact of financial crises to 
the US.24 However, even if all of the increases in current account balances due to 
 
23 In Figure 4, the demographic factors are in the ‘other’ aggregate, which also includes the 
interaction terms and the lags of the current account, but excludes the fixed effect. 
24 Recall that, in the model, the impact of financial crises are ‘channelled’ to the non-crisis 
countries as the dummy variables enter as deviations from the GDP-weighted average. 
 21 
countries undergoing financial crises are allocated to the US it would not be of a 
sufficient magnitude to explain its current account deficit (Figure 5). The estimated 
outflows from crisis-affected countries in recent years are particularly small as the 
last crises in the sample were in 2001, which the model estimates to be too distant 
in the past to be of importance. If the most recent financial crises are actually 
influencing the destination of international capital flows in a sizeable way their 
impact must be considerably greater in magnitude and more prolonged than that of 
previous crises. 
Figure 5: Financial Crises and US Current Account Balance 


























Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
The model captures the broad trends in the current account balances for some of 
the other major regions (Figure 6), with the performance particularly good for the 
major oil-exporting nations. The notable exception is Japan, which the model 
predicts should have shifted from running current account surpluses to deficits, 
whereas actually the surplus increased. This prediction partially reflects the 
relatively rapid ageing of the Japanese population and the widening of the   
fiscal deficit. 
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Interestingly, the model considerably overpredicts east Asia’s current account 
balance prior to the Asian crisis, which might suggest that there were excessive 
capital inflows during this period. 
Figure 6: Model’s Estimates – Fitted and Actual Current Account Balances 


































































Argentina and Brazil %
2005 2000 1995  
Notes:  (a) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
  (b) Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia and Venezuela. 
Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
The performance of the model appears to deteriorate from around 2003, with 
divergences of around 2 percentage points for both east Asia and the major oil 
exporters. It also fails to explain the sizeable widening of China’s current account 
surplus in 2005. 
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7.  Sensitivity Analysis 
7.1  The Exchange Rate 
Dooley et al (2004a) argue that some countries (such as China) have undervalued 
their exchange rate in order to promote growth in the traded sector, and view the 
substantial increases in foreign exchange reserves as a consequence of this 
policy.25 This has not been accounted for explicitly in our model, although the 
financial crisis dummy variables may partially capture the increase in reserves. We 
experimented with adding the real exchange rate to the model as a deviation from a 
statistical trend estimate, and included one lag (see Appendix C for the model 
results).26 The performance of the model appears to improve for several regions 
for particular periods (compare Figures 6 and 7) – such as the major oil exporters 
during 1996, China from 2003 onwards, and the US from 1999–2001. However, 
the overall improvement to the fit of the model from including the real exchange 
rate is small.27 
                                           
25 Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) extend the intertemporal model to include the real exchange rate. 
26 We use a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to isolate the cyclical component. We set the 
smoothing parameter to 400, which yields a very smooth trend estimate. Similar results were 
obtained with lower values. 
27 The real exchange rate may be endogenous. If we instrument it with longer lags (which may 
be weak instruments), the fitted values display the same broad trends as in Figure 7, but are 
more volatile. 
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Figure 7: Model’s Estimates Including the Real Exchange Rate – Fitted and 
Actual Current Account Balances 

































































Argentina and Brazil %
2005 2000 1995
East Asia(a) Major oil exporters(b)
 
Notes:  (a) Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
  (b) Iran, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia and Venezuela. 
Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
7.2  Including China in the Asian Crisis 
The dating of financial crises, described in Section 4.1.1, does not include China in 
the Asian crisis. However, China’s reserve assets as a share of GDP declined 
slightly from 1997 to 2000, which may have reflected pressure on its fixed 
exchange rate due to contagion from other crisis countries (Figure 1). After 2000, 
China’s reserve assets increased strongly, possibly as authorities attempted to 
increase investor confidence. Consequently, as the Asian crisis appears to have 
influenced China’s foreign reserve accumulation, we re-estimate the model 
assuming that the Chinese economy responded as if it had been one of the crisis 
economies in 1997. The impact of this change on the coefficient estimates is 
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minimal (see Appendix C), and for the fitted values is limited mainly to China 
itself during the crisis (Figure 8). The estimated total capital outflow from crisis-
affected countries during the Asian crisis does increase, but remains small overall. 
Figure 8: Model’s Estimates Including China in the Asian Crisis –  
China’s Fitted and Actual Current Account Balances 
















(with crisis in 1997)
2005 2001 1997 1993  
Sources:  IMF, WEO; authors’ calculations 
8.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to explain movements in current account balances 
using panel data. The model appears to capture the broad patterns in the current 
account balances of east Asia, China, the major oil exporters, and Argentina and 
Brazil over most of the sample. The model does less well from 2003 onwards and 
does not match the trends in the current account balances of Japan or the US. 
Overall, our results provide some support for the global saving glut hypothesis. 
Demographic shifts and changes in fiscal balances, while statistically significant, 
cannot fully explain recent developments in current accounts. Expectations of 
future growth, as suggested by the intertemporal model of the current account, 
appear to influence the destination of capital flows. The ability to provide sound 
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financial instruments, as emphasised by Caballero et al (2007), may be important, 
as the quality of institutions was found to have a large effect. In order to fully 
evaluate the interaction between supply and demand of financial assets, which 
Caballero  et al emphasise, a more structural model is probably required. 
Additionally, some of the determinants of international capital flows – such as the 
perceived quality of financial markets, institutions, or investor sentiment – are 
inherently difficult to measure. Finally, financial crises do appear to increase net 
capital outflows from crisis regions for a number of years, although the estimated 
magnitude of these effects is insufficient to fully explain the pattern of recent 
international capital flows. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A1: Statistical Sources and Databases 
Abbreviation Full  title 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
IFS  International Financial Statistics, IMF, August 2006 
ILO  International Labour Organization 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RBNZ  Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
WDI  World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006 
WEO  World Economic Outlook, IMF, September 2006 
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Table A2: Data Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Definition and notes  Sources 
(CA/GDP)it  Current account balance to GDP; in  
percentage terms. 
ABS; RBNZ; WDI; WEO 
crisisit-k  Financial crises; episodes listed as: (i) systemic 
banking crises in Caprio and Klingebiel; or  
(ii) a currency crisis lasting for more than  
12 months in Kaminsky. Crises attributed to the 
current account or sudden stops in Kaminsky  
are excluded. 
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Kaminsky (2003) 
realexchangerateit  Real effective exchange rate; a HP filter  
is taken through the log level of the real 
exchange rate. The deviation from trend is  
the difference between the log level of the real 
exchange rate and the HP-filtered log level. 
JP Morgan; WDI 
fiscalbalanceit  Fiscal balance to GDP; in percentage terms.  ADB; IFS; IMF Article IV 
consultations; OECD; 
WEO 
termsoftradeit  Terms of trade; export prices over import  
prices. Due to a lack of data, the Russian  
terms of trade is proxied by the eastern Europe 
terms of trade. 
Bloomberg; Datastream; 
IFS 
institutionsit  Institutional quality; measured using the 
aggregate Economic Freedom of the World 
index. Data are available on a 5-yearly basis 
from 1970 to 2000; thereafter, they are available 
on an annual basis until 2004. Data are linearly 
interpolated between observations. Values for 
2005 are assumed to be held constant at 2004 
values. 
Gwartney and Lawson 
(2006) 
dependencyratioit  Dependency ratios; ratio of dependents (those 
aged less than 15 and over 64 years) to the 
working-age population (those aged  
15–64 years). 
ILO; National Statistics 
Republic of China 
(Taiwan); WDI 
growthit  GDP growth forecasts; the two-year-ahead 
forecasts taken from the April/May WEO are 
used. Measured in per cent terms. 
IMF 
financialdeepnessit  Stock market turnover; total value of shares 
traded to average real-market capitalisation. 
Beck et al (2000) 
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Appendix B: Financial Crises 
Shading denotes the onset of a financial crisis. For a description of the dating 
method and sources, see Section 4.1.1. 
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Appendix C: Further Results 
In the models below we include the real exchange rate or China in the Asian crisis. 
Table C1: Estimation Results (continued next page) 
Dependent variable is the current account to GDP ratio 
  Original  Including the real 
exchange rate 
Including China in 
the Asian crisis 























































































Table C1: Estimation Results (continued) 
Dependent variable is the current account to GDP ratio 
  Original Including the real 
exchange rate 
Including China in 
the Asian crisis 



















realexchangerateit   –0.007 
(0.01) 
 




2 0.40  0.42  0.40 
Number of observations  443  443  443 
Instruments  ∆(CA/GDP)it–3  ∆(CA/GDP)it–3  ∆(CA/GDP)it–3 








Notes:  Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 per cent levels  respectively. Fixed effects are not reported. 
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